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The South African Medicines Control Council (MCC) policy 
that trial participants be paid a flat rate of R150 per visit in 
clinical trials has been criticised in the press.1 The literature 
argues that it is an excessive or inappropriate reward;2 it 
neglects salient factors such as the design or nature of the 
study,2,3 and non-industry-funded trials may not be able to 
afford it.3 Also, this amount could be regarded as an ‘undue 
inducement’ for participants to enrol.
In our view, the main problem is that the MCC policy 
violates the ethical principle of justice in that participants are 
paid the same amount but do not do the same things or incur 
the same expenses.4 It has been argued that it would be more 
appropriate to have a broad contextualised policy5 and that 
participants should be paid for their time and expenses.2 To 
take these recommendations forward, we apply two theoretical 
models of payment (the Wage Payment and Reimbursement 
models) for time, inconvenience and expenses (TIE). We 
recommend that participants be paid for their time at a rate 
similar to national unskilled labour rates, with increments for 
inconvenient procedures (determined nationally), and that 
they are refunded their direct expenses; this is operationally 
complex but ethically sound.
Our recommendations for stakeholders include that the 
National Health Research Ethics Council (NHREC) assumes 
control of payment norms and endorses payment for TIE.
A new payment approach may experience some resistance 
because of community expectations and researchers who have 
enjoyed a simple administrative procedure.
Types of payment
Four types of payment have been identified.6 Compensation 
payments are intended to compensate for time, inconvenience, 
discomfort and other research-related burdens (not risks). 
Reimbursement payments are refunds to participants 
for direct research-related expenses. Incentive payments 
encourage participation either intentionally, when payment is 
given over and above compensation and reimbursement, or 
inadvertently, when payment unintentionally exceeds direct 
costs and burdens. Appreciation payments are bonuses given 
after participation to thank participants for their efforts.6
The debate about payment
Although a few hold that research participants should never be 
paid,7 controversy centres largely on what should be paid for, 
and a sum that is appropriate. The principal justification for 
payment is that it facilitates recruitment of participants.8 When 
research is scientifically valid, has a favourable balance of risks 
and benefits, and meets other ethical criteria,9 recruitment is an 
ethically sound objective. Payment reduces financial obstacles 
to participation by making participation a ‘revenue-neutral 
activity’6,8,10 and respectfully acknowledges the burdens that 
participation in research involves.6
There are four main objections to payment. Firstly, payment 
to participants leads to the ‘commodification’ of what should 
be an altruistic venture.8 However, people who contribute 
to society’s welfare in other areas (e.g. fire-fighters) receive 
pay; therefore, receiving pay can be compatible with altruistic 
motives.8,11,12 Research has long been commercialised,12 so it is 
not clear why participants should be singled out as having to 
have altruistic motives. Participants are apparently motivated 
by many factors, including money.2 It would be sensible to 
acknowledge this and to concentrate on reducing any negative 
effects of that influence.13
Secondly, payment could be more attractive to indigent 
participants, leading to their over-representation in research 
and to a disproportionate burden on them;8 for example, poor 
people may be willing to undergo risks in return for rewards 
that better-off people would reject.14 However, the logical 
response of decreasing payment amounts would make it even 
harder for poor people to participate.8 It may be more logical 
to increase payment amounts to make participation more 
worthwhile to better-off people.11
Thirdly, payment could influence participants to be dishonest 
about information that would lead to their exclusion;8,14 but 
more objective eligibility criteria would be more logical than 
eliminating payment.8 While participants in lower-risk studies 
may be willing to conceal information, this does not seem to 
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be associated with payment.8 In any event, payment may not 
influence participants to conceal health information.2
Fourthly, payment may undermine the quality of 
participants’ decisions8 and can tend to be coercive.8 However, 
coercion is decision-making under threat of harm and not in 
terms of limited options or a strong influence.8 Payment is 
an offer and not a threat8 and, while ethically complicated, 
is not coercive. Others assert that payment can be an ‘undue 
inducement’, but an inducement is merely an offer that 
encourages or changes a particular behaviour.11 Payment may 
well be a financial inducement in research (better medical care 
may be a non-financial inducement) but is not necessarily 
ethically objectionable. An undue inducement is an excessive 
offer that distorts decision-making or impairs judgement 
by blinding research participants to potential study risks or 
causing them to minimise their concerns.14 This definition 
includes participants who are led to enrol in potentially 
seriously harmful research11 and acknowledges that payment 
becomes more controversial when there are doubts that an 
expert Research Ethics Committee (REC) has determined that 
the study risks are acceptably low.11 A suitable response may be 
to put a reasonable cap on payment amounts,8 improve consent 
processes regarding risks11 and ensure that competent ethical 
review has reduced risks to acceptable levels.8,11 There are no 
data confirming that payment leads to impaired judgement.11
Objections to paying patient-participants are that it makes 
the patient-provider relationship more complex, and that 
patients may receive a direct benefit that healthy volunteers 
will not. However, payment may actually reduce the 
‘therapeutic misconception’, and some trial procedures do not 
confer direct benefit.4
Objections to payment for child participation include that 
payment can distort the judgement of parent and child, and 
that it seems unfair to pay parents when children bear the 
research burdens. Therefore, compensatory payments should 
be made to the party assuming the burden (usually the child) at 
rates comparable with what children would receive for similar 
activities. Payment should be in kind (e.g. vouchers) to protect 
children’s assets from parents.6 Reimbursement payments 
should go to the party incurring costs, and cash seems most 
appropriate.
Ethical guidance on payment
Many ethical guidelines raise the issue of payment to research 
participants as being potentially problematic, frequently 
because of concerns about informed consent or justice. South 
African guidelines are not completely concordant, but all South 
African ethical guidelines endorse reimbursement payments. 
Guidelines governing research funded by the Medical Research 
Council (MRC) endorse compensation payments for time 
and inconvenience, whereas the Department of Health tends 
to endorse incentive payments (payment may be a ‘financial 
benefit’).
Many international ethical guidelines are silent on payment 
(e.g. Belmont Report, Declaration of Helsinki). Those that 
address the topic endorse reimbursement payments and 
compensation payments for time and inconvenience but do not 
provide operational guidance on the latter (e.g. UNAIDS, 2007; 
CIOMS, 2002).
Models to operationalise payment for 
TIE
Two models go some way towards delineating payment in a 
way that broad ethical guidelines do not.6,8,10,11
Paying for time
The Wage Payment model10 advocates compensation payment 
for time and inconvenience. Payment for time is calculated at 
an hourly rate commensurate with that for other unskilled but 
essential jobs.8,10 While participants do not need any specific 
skills or training, participation does entail the expending of 
time and effort.10 Therefore, to be fair, payments to research 
participants should be consistent with payments for other 
similar activities,11 and participants should be paid the 
same for the same amount of ‘work’.8,10 The tendency for 
undue inducement is lessened as participants receive similar 
money-making opportunities in the community.8,10 Also, 
standardisation of payment reduces inter-study competition.8,10
However, payment for time at these rates may not facilitate 
recruitment,10 especially of higher wage earners.15 Rate 
differentials between rural and urban settings or various 
sectors of unskilled labour16 need to be considered. (In South 
Africa, sectoral unskilled labour rates are currently under 
review, and the general category of unskilled labour no longer 
exists. At present, domestic workers are paid approximately 
R5.00/hour when rural and urban sectors are averaged; 
and construction workers in certain urban regions get 
approximately R10.00/hour.) In their application of the wage 
payment model, Dickert and Grady10 used a national average 
wage. It is possible that averages could exceed region-specific 
payments for similar activities (causing participants to conceal 
information or devalue risks). However, where rural-urban or 
sector differences are negligible, this is not likely, and a national 
average seems reasonable. Where stakeholders insist that it is 
fairer to implement rural-urban distinctions in payment for 
participants at different sites, the difference could be placed in 
a fund for community development activities. Even in settings 
with high unemployment, offering time-related payments at 
unskilled labour rates is arguably fairer and less likely to be 
an inappropriately high incentive than rates determined by a 
market model,10 or even a flat rate.
Paying for inconvenience
The Wage Payment model advocates additional payments 
for inconvenient procedures8,10 (which acknowledges that 
participation sometimes entails discomfort10) and may make 
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participation more attractive. However, this requires complex 
evaluation, for which there is little available guidance. Paying 
for inconvenience, but not for risk, can be problematic. 
Inconvenient procedures are trouble- or bothersome, or 
disturb routine.17 Risky procedures hold the possibility of 
physical, psychosocial or economic harm. Consequences such 
as embarrassment could be viewed as either inconvenience 
or risk. These ramifications can probably be offset by further 
conceptual work defining the differences, and building the 
capacity of gatekeepers such as RECs, to apply the distinctions. 
While experiences of inconvenience will be subjective and 
differ among participants, the standard is to estimate what 
a ‘reasonable person’ would find inconvenient – a concept 
routinely applied by RECs when making risk estimations.11
Payment for inconvenience seems hard to apply without 
seeming arbitrary. According to the National Institutes for 
Health (NIH),18 the study’s principal investigator determines 
inconvenience rates. Dickert and Grady10 suggest amounts for 
inconvenience but not how they classed procedures as such 
or how they arrived at the amounts. Determining rates for 
inconvenient procedures will always tend to be arbitrary or 
complex. This can be offset if legitimate institutions, through 
collective and informed decision-making, reach consensus 
and make preliminary recommendations on amounts paid 
for inconvenient procedures that can be adopted in trials by 
researchers and enforced by RECs.
Paying for expenses
The Reimbursement model10 advocates payment for 
participants’ direct expenses (e.g. transport costs, meals and 
child care). Participants are therefore not out of pocket. Because 
only actual costs are covered, concerns regarding participants’ 
misrepresentation or failure to consider risks are minimised, 
and indigent people are not especially encouraged to 
participate.8,10 However, since participation is not incentivised, 
it may be difficult to meet recruitment targets.8,10 It must also be 
decided whether time away from work will be reimbursed and, 
if so, if participants are paid according to their income, which 
could cause researchers to target low-wage earners to reduce 
costs.8 Therefore, it has been argued that this cost be excluded.
Since reimbursement will differ among participants, 
administration of this approach will be more complex. It may 
be difficult to prove what each participant has spent, as receipts 
may not be available. To simplify the procedure, and for 
budgeting purposes, researchers should engage in formative 
research and consult Community Advisory Boards (CABs) 
to assess expected costs to participants, e.g. transport to the 
research site.
Anecdotally, researchers already appear to implement this 
approach, as in the case of participants presenting for repeated 
unscheduled visits. Researchers could consider separating 
reimbursement payments from standardised time and 
inconvenience payments.
The MCC’s payment policy for trials
The MCC policy does not fit the model of ‘compensation for 
time or inconvenience’ as participants are not paid according 
to time spent or inconvenience, e.g. participants who take 30 
minutes to complete a simple questionnaire are paid the same 
as those who undergo hours of uncomfortable procedures 
– participants are paid the same but are not doing the same 
things or making the same contributions, which is unfair.4
The MCC flat rate does not fit the model of ‘reimbursement 
of expenses’ as participants are not reimbursed for their 
actual expenses, e.g. owing to differing transport costs, some 
participants may incur a loss while others may score financially. 
The flat rate could become an incentive if remuneration exceeds 
actual expenses or burdens. However, our primary concern is 
not with ‘undue inducement’ but with fairness.
Another concern is that the ruling on participant payment is 
beyond the MCC’s mandate.5 In South Africa, the mandate for 
setting norms and standards for research falls on the NHREC 
(s73, NHA, 2003),19 which is more suited for setting standards 
for payment.
Conclusions
The MCC’s policy of participants being paid a flat rate 
of R150 per trial visit has two apparent advantages: it is 
simple to administer and appears to be fair because all trial 
participants ostensibly receive the same amount; however, it is 
fundamentally unjust as participants are paid the same amount 
regardless of their differing inputs and outlays.4,14 When 
research stakeholders acknowledge that paying participants the 
same amount for different contributions is unfair, alternative 
approaches should be seriously considered.
Participants should be paid for their actual expense and time 
outlays at a rate that approximates national unskilled labour 
rates, with additional payment for inconvenient procedures.
If TIE payment is implemented, trial payments will differ. A 
trial with fewer, shorter visits and less inconvenient procedures 
will pay participants less than one with many, longer visits and 
complex procedures. When participants are paid for their actual 
expenses, their remuneration will differ, which will require 
participants (and participating communities) to understand 
what is being paid for, so that the differences are understood to 
be fair. It is pertinent that participants are routinely expected 
to understand much more complex concepts (such as placebo/
controls) than differing payment rates.
A new payment schedule that takes into account the 
nature of the study (length, procedures) and the individual 
costs to participants will not be seen as legitimate unless 
‘fair differences’ are understood. Limiting payment to 
reimbursement of expenses and payment for time and 
inconvenience may also be the best way to keep financial 
inducements ‘due’.12 While this approach may involve logistical 
challenges and complex administration, it reflects a payment 
policy underpinned by thoughtful, ethical reflection.
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Recommendations for stakeholders
1.   The MCC should revoke its payment policy.
2.    Research organisations, including their RECs, should audit 
the payment practices that prevailed prior to the flat rate.
3.    The NHREC should adopt TIE payment, draft standardised 
rates for procedures, discuss these with stakeholders, 
recommend their implementation for a trial period, and 
ratify these rates.
4.    South African guideline developers should revise ethical 
guidelines to endorse TIE payment and engagement with 
communities on aspects of payment.
5.    Researchers should estimate expenses in consultation with 
communities and, using national time and inconvenience 
rates, prepare payment schedules for presentation to RECs.
6.    RECs should implement TIE payment and stipulate that 
it be included in the consent process because it is material 
to volunteers deciding on participation. RECs should be 
familiar with rates for unskilled labour around the country.
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The Children’s Amendment Act1 and the Criminal Law 
(Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act2 
(Sexual Offences Act) impose duties on medical practitioners 
and others to report child abuse and sexual offences against 
children and mentally disabled persons that go beyond those in 
the Child Care Act3 and the Prevention of Family Violence Act.4 
The latter Acts will be repealed once the relevant provisions of 
the Children’s Amendment Act come into effect.5 The Sexual 
Offences Act came into effect on 16 December 2007.6
Ill-treatment of children under the 
Child Care Act
Until the provisions regarding the duty to report ill-treatment 
of children in terms of the Child Care Act7 are repealed, the 
existing provisions apply.
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